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The wireless networks have changed the way organizations work and offered a new 
range of possibilities, but at the same time they introduced new security threats. While an at-
tacker needs physical access to a wired network in order to launch an attack, a wireless net-
work allows anyone within its range to passively monitor the traffic or even start an attack. 
One of the countermeasures can be  the use of Wireless Intrusion Prevention Systems.  
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vention. 
 
his paper will focus on the WLAN net-
works security threats and their protec-
tion through wireless intrusion prevention 
systems.  
The Wireless Local Area Networks, or 
WLANs, are defined by the IEEE 802.11 
families of standards. An 802.11 WLAN 
consist of stations (laptops, PDAs, mobile 
phones etc) and access points (or APs), 
which logically connect the stations with a 
distribution system (DS), typically the organ-
ization’s wired infrastructure. A WLAN can 
run in ad-hoc mode, without the use of APs, 
and involving a direct communication be-
tween stations and in infrastructure mode, 
in which case the station connects to a DS via 
the access point. The identification of sta-
tions and APs is made by the use of 48-bit 
MAC addresses.  
The initial security standard introduced for 
WLANs, called Wired Equivalent Privacy, or 
shortly WEP, is well-known for its security 
flaws. Introduced in 1999 as part of the 
802.11b, its objective was to secure the wire-
less communication by using the symmetric 
encryption protocol RC4. However it took a 
short time for the WEP weaknesses to be dis-
covered and attack tools to be freely availa-
ble to the public (like AIRSnort and WEP-
Crack). For example, AirSnort can determine 
the encryption key in less then a second, pro-
vided that a sufficient number of packets 
have been gathered – usually in the range of 
5 to 10 million. Even if the number appears 
quite big, on a busy WLAN this volume can 
be generated in a relatively short time. 
To address the issues with WEP, other newer 
protocols (like Wi-Fi Protected Access) were 
introduced, which offer a better protection, 
but still suffer from different security issues. 
The adoption of the WLANs in organizations 
introduced new specific threats for them, and 
as we will see in this paper some of these is-
sues can be covered by using wireless intru-
sion prevention systems. The most important 
threats are presented below. 
Rogue access points - represent unautho-
rized access points and can be internal or ex-
ternal.  
The internal rogue AP is connected to the 
wired network by an unauthorized user (such 
as a regular employee), outside the control of 
the IT personnel. It can behave as a gateway 
for an attacker who can gain access to the 
network without the need to be physically in-
side the organization’s perimeter. Therefore 
the detection and the removal of such rogue 
access points must be considered a critical 
aspect. It can be noted that this threat can af-
fect also organizations which do not use 
WLAN networks in their activity.  
The external rogue access point is not con-
nected to the wired organization’s intranet, 
but emulates a legitimate access point of the 
network. For example, the attacker can set 
the rogue access point’s SSID to the same 
SSID like the legitimate AP, and then in-
crease significantly the signal of the rogue 
AP. Its purpose is to trick the WLAN clients 
by connecting to this rogue AP instead of the 
legitimate AP, since the clients will normally 
try to connect to the AP with the strongest 
signal available and to cause the client asso-
ciation to the rogue AP, making it possible to 
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launch other attacks (obtaining user creden-
tials via spoofed web pages etc). 
MAC address spoofing. An access point can 
be configured so that it keeps a list of the le-
gitimate client stations by MAC address. The 
attacker has the option of compromising such 
a client, or by spoofing with a legitimate 
MAC address. The MAC addresses are uni-
quely assigned at the time of manufacture, 
but usually this value can be set to arbitrary 
chosen values using an appropriate software 
tool. 
Denial-of-Service. A denial of service (DoS) 
attack occurs when a system cannot provide 
services to authorized clients due to resource 
exhaustion by unauthorized clients. This can 
be done by jamming (generate random signal 
on the specified frequencies), flooding with 
associations (the association table main-
tained by the AP has a maximum value – 
when this table overflows, the AP cannot ac-
cept further client association requests), 
forged disassociation (the attacker sends 
spoofed disassociation frames with the 
source MAC address of the AP – in this case 
the station is still authenticated but has to 
send a Reassociation request to the AP; to 
prevent reassociation, the attacker can con-
tinue to send disassociation frames for a spe-
cific period), forged deauthentication (an at-
tack similar to forged disassociation, but 
which uses deauthentication frames). 
 
Monitoring WLAN traffic and breaking 
the encryption keys. There are open-source 
tools, like AIRSnort (for WEP), which can be 
used by anyone to intercept the wireless traf-
fic and computing the encryption keys, pro-
vided there are enough data packets. 
Given the threats outlined above, it becomes 
obvious that for any organization using 
WLANs the monitoring of the air space 
should be an important measure in assuring a 
proper network security. Furthermore, consi-
dering the potential threat introduced by the 
internal unauthorized access points, it is 
highly recommended that any organization 
monitor its air space.  
 
 
Wireless Intrusion Prevention Systems 
(WIPS). 
We will use as a starting point the definitions 
for intrusion detection and intrusion preven-
tion given by NIST [1]: “Intrusion detection 
is the process of monitoring the events occur-
ring in a computer system or network and 
analyzing them for signs of possible inci-
dents, which are violations or imminent 
threats of violation of computer security pol-
icies, acceptable use policies, or standard 
security practices. Intrusion prevention is the 
process of performing intrusion detection 
and attempting to stop detected possible in-
cidents. Intrusion detection and prevention 
systems (IDPS)1  are primarily focused on 
identifying possible incidents, logging infor-
mation about them, attempting to stop them, 
and reporting them to security administra-
tors. „ 
There are several types of intrusion detec-
tion/prevention systems: network-based, 
wireless,  Network Behavior Analysis and 
Host-based. 
A typical wireless intrusion prevention sys-
tem consist of: 
- wireless sensors  – used to monitor and ana-
lyze activity; 
- management server – receives information 
from the sensors and perform analysis; 
- database server – used to store event in-
formation generated by sensors and man-
agement servers; 
-  console – represents the interface for the 
users and administrators. 
In a wireless intrusion prevention system, a 
normal sensor cannot monitor all the traffic 
on a band (which consists of more channels) 
simultaneously and can monitor only a single 
channel at a time; to cover multiple channels, 
it uses a technique called channel scanning, 
which involves monitoring each channel a 
few times per second. To reduce or avoid this 
limitation, there are specialized sensors that 
use several radio modules and can monitor 
several channels at the same time.  
The intrusion prevention systems can detect 
incidents using mainly three methodologies: 
signature-based, anomaly-based and stateful 
protocol analysis. Most systems use multiple Revista Informatica Economică nr.3(47)/2008 
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detection methodologies, either separately or 
integrated, for a more accurate detection. 
Signature-based detection involves compar-
ing signatures against observed events in or-
der to identify possible incidents; this method 
is very effective in the detection of known 
threats but does not provide good results in 
detecting previously unknown threats. 
Anomaly-based detection involves creating 
‘normal’ activity patterns and comparing the 
observed events against these patterns. The 
intrusion detection/prevention system has an 
initial training phase, in which the system 
learns the normal behavior and creates pro-
files, which are used as a base for compari-
son. A static profile is determined in the 
training phase and remains unchanged, whe-
reas a dynamic profile is constantly adjusted 
as additional events are observed.  
Stateful protocol analysis is the process of 
comparing predetermined profiles of general-
ly accepted definitions of benign protocol ac-
tivity for each protocol state against observed 
events to identify deviations. 
The main types of events which can be de-
tected by wireless intrusion prevention sys-
tems are: 
- unauthorized WLANs and WLAN devices 
(rogue APs, unauthorized stations, unautho-
rized WLANs); 
- poorly secured WLAN devices (misconfigu-
rations, use of weak WLAN protocols and 
implementations); 
- unusual usage patterns (using anomaly-
based detection); 
- the use of wireless network scanners – ob-
viously only active scanners can be detected; 
- Denial of Service (DoS) attacks (flooding, 
jamming); 
- Impersonation and man-in-the-middle at-
tacks. 
The prevention capabilities refer to wireless 
actions (such as terminating the connections 
between a rogue or misconfigured station and 
an authorized AP by sendinq deassociation 
messages to the endpoints) and wired actions 
(such as blocking a switch port on which a 
particular station or AP is connected). 
Another feature contained in most wireless 
intrusion prevention systems is tracking the 
location of the threat – by using triangulation 
(estimation of the approximate distance from 
multiple sensors by the strengths of the 
threat’s signal received by each sensor and 
calculation of the physical location based on 
this information ) 
Given the importance of the wireless securi-
ty, many companies have developed wireless 
intrusion detection/prevention systems. One 
of the well-known WIPS is AirDefense 
(www.airdefense.net), which uses context-
aware detection, correlation and multi-
dimensional detection engines, and it claims 
to have a very low rate of false positives. The 
system can detect ad-hoc stations, rogue 
access points, as well as open or misconfi-
gured access points, masquerade attacks (like 
MAC spoofing), man-in-the-middle attacks, 
denial-of-service attacks. The system can be 
configured to play an active role and respond 
automatically to wireless threats by stopping 
the corresponding device before it is able to 
cause damage to the network. For the rogue 
internal APs, the AirDefense system can 
identify the switch port to which the AP is 
connected and turn it off,  thus preventing the 
rogue device from accessing the network. In 
addition, the system can help system admin-
istrators to troubleshoot wireless network 
performance, has location tracking capabili-
ties and can generate standard or customized 
reports. 
There are also open source tools, such as 
Snort-Wireless or Kismet, which have main-
ly intrusion detection capabilities.  
 
Limitations 
Although a Wireless IPS can do a lot of 
things, it has its limitations. For example, it 
cannot detect a passive sniffer – and usually 
an attacker can first collect data traffic before 
launching an attack. This period of passive 
sniffing is quite dangerous, but there is noth-
ing to do in this direction. The only counter-
measure is to use the proper protection 
through encryption. 
Another notable problem refers to the dep-
loyment of sensors. As opposed to a wired 
IDS/IPS system, where the location of the 
sensors follows the logical structure of the Revista Informatica Economică nr.3(47)/2008 
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network, the wireless sensors have to be 
placed based on physical location. 
In addition, there are the common IDS/IPS 
limitations, like the issues of false positives. 
 
Conclusion 
As we saw, the WLANs brought not only ad-
vantages, but also some specific security 
threats. For organizations using WLANs, it is 
obvious that they need protection against 
wireless threats. However a real-time wire-
less intrusion detection tool for the detec-
tion/removal of rogue access points is a must 
for almost any organization. There are many 
WIPS products available, at different price 
tags, and even open-source. The development 
of new wireless standards and security proto-
cols is expected to enhance the WLANs’ se-
curity, but we estimate that wireless intrusion 
prevention systems will continue to play a 
key role in assuring the organization’s securi-
ty. 
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